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JUDGE VERSUS JURY: WHO SHOULD DECIDE
QUESTIONS OF PRELIMINARY FACTS CONDITIONING
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE?
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the virtually undisputed test for the admission of
scientific evidence in the United States was the standard an-
nounced by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in 1923 in Frye v. United States.1 According to
one commentator, by the late 1970's, the Frye rule was the gov-
erning test in forty-five states. 2 Frye established a widespread and
rigorous test. Under Frye, the expert witness' opinion of the valid-
ity of the theory underlying a scientific technique is insufficient;3
the expert also must vouch, as a condition precedent to the admis-
sion of the proffered evidence, that the principle has "gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."' 4 Some
courts toughened the Frye standard by requiring the proponent of
the evidence to call additional expert witnesses to establish the
fact of general acceptance.5 The Frye rule has become a formidable
barrier to the admission of scientific evidence,6 and courts have ex-
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. BA. 1967, J.D. 1969, Univer-
sity of San Francisco. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Loftus of the
Department of Psychology at the University of Washington in Seattle for reviewing and
critiquing a portion of this Article.
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Comment, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
State v. Williams, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 757, 763 (1979).
3. Imwinkelried, Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific Evidence, in ScmN-
Tiric AND EXPERT EVmENCE 33, 43 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981).
4. 293 F. at 1014.
5. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 37, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 152
(1976).
6. See generally Giannelli, The Admissiblity of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1197 (1980); Imwinkelried, The Standard
for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28
Vii. L. REv. 554 (1983).
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cluded a wide variety of scientific techniques.7
In part because the general acceptance requirement excludes so
much scientific proof, the Frye rule has come under heavy attack.8
As early as 1954, Dean McCormick argued that the general accept-
ance requirement was an unduly strict standard for the admission
of scientific evidence.9 He urged the courts to convert general ac-
ceptance into a test for judicial notice rather than admissibility.10
Recent commentators have continued the attack,11 and have met
with some measure of success. Fifteen states 2 and federal courts in
two circuits,' 3 have repudiated Frye or questioned its precedential
value. The debate, however, has not been one-sided-both courts
4
and commentators' 5 have defended the Frye rule.
This Article raises an issue that has been obscured by the debate
over the Frye rule:' 6 the question of the procedure used to deter-
7. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); State v. Boyington, 153
N.J. Super. 252, 379 A.2d 486 (1977); People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503
(1977).
8. Giannelli, General Acceptance of Scientific Tests-Frye and Beyond, in ScIENIrFic
AND EXPaRT EVIDENCE 11 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981); Giannelli, supra note 6, at 1204-28;
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissiblity, 67 IowA L.
REv. 879 (1982).
9. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363 (1954).
10. Id.
11. See Giannelli, supra note 6; Imwinkelried, supra note 6.
12. The states are California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michi-
gan, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. See Im-
winkeiried, supra note 6, at 557-59. See also State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 978-81 (La.
1979); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 458 (Wyo. 1977).
13. See United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-1200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979);
United States v. Dorfman, 532 F, Supp. 1118, 1134 n.14 (N.D. M. 1981).
14. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30-31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148 (1976); State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 53-54, 622 P.2d 986, 991-92 (1981). The recent
passage of Proposition 8 in California may overrule Kelly and similar California decisions.
See Uelmen, Proposition 8 Casts Uncertainty over Vast Areas of Criminal Law, 2 CAL.
LAW., July-Aug. 1982, at 43, 45.
15. See, e.g., Starts, "A Still-Life Watercolor". Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI.
684 (1982).
16. The intense debate over the Frye test prompted the National Conference of Lawyers
and Scientists to conduct a workshop on the future of the Frye test. See Symposium on
Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983). Professor Moenssens analyzes the
wisdom of the Frye test in his contribution to this Symposium. See Moenssens, Admissibil-
ity of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 545
(1984).
JUDGE VERSUS JURY
mine the preliminary facts that condition the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence. Under the regime of Frye, the trial court judge
determines the preliminary facts of general acceptance and validity
underlying the proffered scientific evidence.17 The judge hears ar-
guments and reviews evidence from both sides on the general ac-
ceptance and validity of the scientific technique. If the judge finds
that the preliminary facts do not exist, he makes a binding deter-
mination that the evidence is inadmissible and forbids the propo-
nent from submitting the evidence to the jury."' In this fashion,
the judge screens unreliable scientific proof from the jury.19 As ju-
risdictions have abandoned the Frye test and relaxed the substan-
tive test for admitting scientific evidence, however, some courts
and commentators have moved towards the view that the jury
should determine the validity of the scientific theory underlying
the proffered evidence.2 0 If the Frye rule is no longer valid, a show-
ing of general acceptance is no longer necessary; the proponent of
the evidence must show only the preliminary fact of the validity of
the underlying scientific theory. In the parlance of preliminary
factfinding, the issue of a theory's validity is a question of condi-
tional relevance, in which the judge's limited role is to determine
whether, as a matter of law, the proponent has presented evidence
with sufficient probative value to support a rational jury finding
that the fact exists. The jury then determines whether the fact
does exist. Some courts21 and distinguished commentators 22 agree
that the validity of a scientific principle is a question of conditional
relevance entrusted to the jury's final decision. Even more signifi-
cantly, the Federal Rules of Evidence-rules that have been
17. See People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 459, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 492 (1968). See
generally Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL.
L.F. 1.
18. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 104(a).
19. P. Giannelli, Frye v. United States 2 (April 29, 1983) (unpublished manuscript pre-
pared for the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists).
20. See, e.g., State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981); 5 D. LouisELL & C.
MuELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 522, at 146 (1981); 5 J. WENSTmiN & K. BERGER, WEIN-
sTmN's EVIDENCE 901(b)(9)[02]-[03] (1982).
21. See, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); State v.
Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981).
22. D. LouisEL. & C. Muu=, supra note 20; J. WEINSTmN & M. BERGER, supra note 20;
Rosenthal, Nature of Jury Response to the Expert Witness, 28 J. FoRNSic SCL 528, 529
(1983).
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adopted in twenty-four states's-arguably allocate the question to
the jury's final determination.24
The procedure for determining the preliminary fact of validity is
important for several reasons. First, Frye may no longer be good
law in more than a quarter of the states and two federal circuits.25
Trial judges in those jurisdictions need to know whether they
should decide the preliminary fact or submit the fact to the jury
for resolution. Moreover, the procedure for determining the pre-
liminary fact of validity is closely tied to the controversy over
Frye. One of the foremost rationales for the Frye rule is the as-
sumption that lay jurors are incompetent to evaluate scientific
proof critically. The Frye rule rests on the premise that most lay
jurors overestimate the probative value of scientific evidence and,
therefore, need the protection of a screening by the trial judge.26
Like the debate over Frye, the proper procedure for determining
the admissibility of scientific evidence is related to the capacity of
the jury.17 If lay jurors cannot judge the weight of scientific proof
properly, entrusting them with the final determination of the va-
lidity of the underlying scientific theory is dangerous.
Finally, applying the procedure for determining the admissibility
of conditionally relevant evidence to scientific proof may exacer-
bate some of the weaknesses in scientific proof. If a scientific prin-
ciple's validity is an issue of conditional relevance, the judge has a
narrow role. Under a conditional relevance procedure, the jury de-
23. The states, with dates of adoption, are: Alaska (1979), Arizona (1977), Arkansas
(1976), Colorado (1980), Delaware (1980), Florida (1979), Hawaii (1981), Maine (1976),
Michigan (1978), Minnesota (1977), Montana (1977), Nebraska (1975), Nevada (1971), New
Mexico (1973), North Dakota (1977), Ohio (1980), Oklahoma (1978), Oregon (1982), South
Dakota (1978), Texas (1983), Vermont (1983), Washington (1979), Wisconsin (1974), and
Wyoming (1978). See R. CARLSON, E. ImWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY
OP EVIDENCE 8 (1983).
24. D. LousEml & C. MUELLER, supra note 20; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20.
25. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
26. A "misleading aura of certainty ... often envelops a new scientific process." People
v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976) (quoting
Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262
(1966)). This aura often causes jurors to attribute a "mystic infallibility" to scientific testi-
mony. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978); P. Giannelli, supra note 19.
27. See generally Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor of David Louisell,
66 CAL. L. Rxv. 987 (1978).
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termines the credibility of the proponent's foundational evidence
and hears the opponent's controverting evidence.28 In contrast, the
judge may hear only the proponent's evidence, accept or reject that
evidence at face value, and decide only the question of law: does
the evidence have sufficient probative value to support a rational
jury finding that the principle is valid?,' The application of this
procedure to scientific evidence is troublesome. The judge's ability
to hear only one side of the scientific dispute is dangerous. Some
scientific techniques such as sound spectrography have latent
weaknesses that can be effectively exposed only by contrary expert
testimony.30 Certainly, a peril exists in accepting the proponent's
testimony at face value. In some cases, the proponent's expert has
built a reputation on the scientific technique and is markedly bi-
ased in favor of the technique.31 Forcing the judge to hear only the
proponent's testimony and to accept it at face value heightens the
risk of admitting untrustworthy scientific evidence.
The thesis of this Article is that the risk is so great that, to en-
sure the reliability of the jury's ultimate verdict, the trial judge
should determine the preliminary fact of the validity of the theory
or technique underlying the proffered scientific evidence. Part two
of this Article chronicles the evolution of preliminary factfinding
procedures in the United States, attempting to identify the crite-
rion for allocating preliminary facts to the judge rather than the
jury. Part three applies that criterion to scientific evidence and ad-
vances the argument that the criterion requires allocation of the
preliminary fact of validity to the judge. Part four of the Article
construes the Federal Rules of Evidence and reluctantly concludes,
28. State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981); Seidelson, Conditional Rele-
vancy and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), 47 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 1048, 1059 (1979).
29. See FED. R. Evm. 104(b); Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in De-
termining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HRv. L. REv. 392, 400 (1927); Saltzburg, Stan-
dards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 303 (1975).
30. People v. Chapter, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2479 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1973) ("In approxi-
mately eighty percent of the twenty-five [earlier voiceprint] cases in which such expert testi-
mony/opinion was admitted, there was no opposing expert testimony on the issue of reliabil-
ity and general acceptability by the scientific community."). See also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 49 (1979) (in "the very
large proportion [of trials,] the only experts testifying were those called by the state").
31. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 38, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
153 (1976); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 145, 257 N.W.2d 537, 539-40 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
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however, that the rules allocate the determination of validity to
the jury. The Article closes, therefore, by calling for the amend-
ment of rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
II. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PRELIMINARY
FACTS CONDITIONING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
When a party proffers an item of evidence-such as a document
or some oral testimony-and the other party objects, the judge
must decide whether to admit the evidence. The applicable rules of
evidence prescribe the foundation or predicate for the admission of
the evidence.32 If a plaintiff offers testimony about a decedent's
statements, for example, the defendant may object that the evi-
dence is incompetent hearsay.3 3 Assume that the plaintiff replies
that the testimony falls within the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule. 4 Before the testimony could qualify under that
exception, the proponent would have to lay a foundation demon-
strating such facts as the declarant's nervous excitement at the
time of the statement. 5 In another case, the opponent may object
to a question on the ground that the question calls for privileged
information, such as an attorney-client communication.36 The pro-
ponent may respond that no privilege exists because both parties
knew that a third party was within hearing distance at the time of
the communication. 7 The judge would have to resolve the factual
question of the third party's proximity before ruling on the claim
of privilege. Both examples present foundational or preliminary
facts that condition the admissibility of the proffered evidence,38
and raise the question of what procedure the judge should use to
determine the existence of these facts.
32. E. IMRWINKELEED, EVDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 1-6 (1980).
33. See FaD. R. Evm. 801, 802.
34. See FaD. R. EvID. 803(2). See generally E. IMWINKLRmD, supra note 32, at 187-89.
35. FED. R. Evm. 803(2); E. IMWInKRIED, supra note 32, at 188.
36. See McCoRmIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (2d ed. 1972) [herein-
after cited as McCoRMICK].
37. See E. IMwINKELRmD, P. GIANNELU, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
190-92 (1979).
38. See generally 1 D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 28, at 173-78; Annot., 14
A.L.R.4th 594 (1982).
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A. The Early American View
Most early American trial judges resolved unsettled procedural
questions by following British norms.3 9 American judges followed
this practice in fashioning preliminary factfinding procedures. °
The traditional English rule was that the judge determined the ex-
istence of all preliminary facts.41 The judge would hear the evi-
dence on both sides, resolve any incidental questions of credibility,
and make a final ruling on the existence of the foundational fact. 2
The American courts imported the English practice"3 and the trial
judge's power to determine definitively the existence of prelimi-
nary facts became an "article of faith."" This common law rule
was codified in rule 8 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,45 rule 11
of the Model Code of Evidence, 46 and state statutes, such as sec-
tion 2102 of the California Code of Civil Procedure of 1872.4 7 Vir-
tually universal agreement existed that the judge was the final ar-
biter of preliminary fact questions. 8 Some courts carried the
common law rule to great lengths.'9
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lee"0 is il-
lustrative. In Lee, all the witnesses agreed that Mack Lee was the
murderer. The only question was whether the defendant was Mack
Lee. The defendant called Lee's wife to testify that the defendant
was not Lee. At the time of the trial, Louisiana still adhered to the
39. J. MAGUIR, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 212 (1947).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 212, 230-31.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 212.
44. See Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29; see also 21 C. WRIGHT & Y. GRAHAM, FEEmRAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 5052, 5053 (1977).
45. UNw. R. Evil. 8, reprinted in C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5051, at 241
n.1.
46. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 11 (1942), reprinted in C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 44, § 5051, at 241 n.3.
47. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2102 (1872) (repealed 1965). See 9 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE
§ 2550, at 643 n.3 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
48. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5052, at 249-50.
49. See, e.g., Gorton v. Hadsell, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 508, 511 (1852) (judge's province in-
cludes right to resolve "any preliminary questions of fact, however intricate, the solution of
which may be necessary to enable him to determine the... admissibility of evidence").
The United States Supreme Court subsequently sanctioned this view in Gila Valley, Globe
& N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914).
50. 127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356 (1911).
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rigid common law rule that one spouse was incompetent to testify
for the other. Invoking the rule, the prosecutor objected that the
witness was incompetent. The prosecutor's objection thus posed
the question whether the defendant was Mack Lee; the prelimi-
nary fact conditioning the admission of Mrs. Lee's testimony coin-
cided with the pivotal, ultimate fact in the case. The trial judge
followed the normal practice, dedided that the defendant was mar-
ried to Mrs. Lee, and barred her testimony and the defendant was
convicted.5 1
On appeal, the defendant argued that, if the preliminary fact co-
incides with the ultimate fact before the jury, the jury should de-
termine the preliminary fact's existence.52 The appellate court
brushed aside the argument and found "no reason.., for depart-
ing from the rule that the competency of witnesses is a matter for
the court, and not for the jury, to pass upon."5 3 Thus, Lee followed
the English tradition although the ruling on the preliminary fact's
existence had a dispositive impact on the jury's verdict and the
outcome of the case.54
B. Criticism of the Early American View
Although the English practice was widespread in the United
States, courts occasionally deviated from that practice.5 5 Some ju-
risdictions adopted the "second crack" or "humanitarian" doc-
trine.58 In cases involving confessions and dying declarations, these
jurisdictions allowed the opponent to ask the jury to determine
that the evidence was inadmissible although the judge already had
decided to admit the evidence.57 The courts reasoned that these
types of evidence were so damning and so potentially unreliable
that the defendant deserved the additional safeguard of a second
chance to attack the admissibility of the evidence.58 Under the sec-
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 1080-81, 54 So. at 357.
54. For a discussion of Lee, see Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29, at 408-10.
55. J. MAGUIRE, supra note 39, at 217-20.
56. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 498, 193 N.E. 68, 70 (1934); see
also J. MAGUtRE, supra note 39, at 219-20.
57. J. MAGUME, supra note 39, at 220.
58. Note, Dying Declarations, 46 IowA L. REv. 375, 386 (1961).
[Vol. 25:577584
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ond crack doctrine, the judge performed the normal preliminary
factfinding functions, but the judge's ruling did not bind the jury.
Some critics of the traditional English practice favored a more
extreme departure from the common law rule to further expand
the jury's role. 9 The Jacksonians, for example, advanced political
and constitutional justifications for shifting factfinding power to
the jurors.60 Fearful of oppression by a powerful judiciary, the
Jacksonians championed the popular election of judges.61 Their
democratic beliefs also prompted them to advocate a shift of some
preliminary factfinding power to the jury.62 The Jacksonians con-
tended that the jury at least should be empowered to decide
straightforward preliminary factual questions.63 To the Jacksoni-
ans, an allocation of those questions to the judge unnecessarily in-
fringed democratic ideals.
The sixth and seventh amendments to the United States Consti-
tution" gave the Jacksonians an alternative, constitutional argu-
ment. Those amendments establish a right to a jury trial, entitling
parties to a jury determination 'of facts, rather than a judicial de-
termination.6 5 The amendments implement the democratic ideal
by proclaiming the primacy of the jury's role as factfinder.66 The
Jacksonians argued that if a judge resolves a preliminary fact ques-
tion related to the merits of the case, he necessarily deprives the
parties of a jury trial.67 Mustering a small army of pejoratives, the
critics charged that the unnecessary allocation of factfinding power
to the judge frustrated the jury's legitimate functions.68 The Jack-
59. See, e.g., Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29; Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in
the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 Hnv. L. REv. 165 (1929).
60. See C. WmwGHr & K. GRAJAM, supra note 44, § 5052, at 251.
61. See id.; Round Table Discussions on the Proposed Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 785, 817 (1972) (remarks of Prof. E. Wayne Thode).
62. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5052, at 251.
63. Id.
64. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
65. Kaus, All Power to the Jury-California's Democratic Evidence Code, 4 Loy. L-.L.
REv. 233, 252 (1971).
66. 1 D. LouisELu & C. MuaujxR, supra note 20, § 26, at 156-57; Kaplan, supra note 27,
at 993.
67. Laughlin, Preliminary Questions of Fact: A New Theory, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
285, 302 (1974); see also J. MAGunE, supra note 39, at 218; Maguire & Epstein, supra note
29, at 397.
68. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1219 (E.D.
1984]
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sonians often cited Coke's maxim, "Ad quaestionem facti non re-
spondent judices, ad quaestionem juris non respondent
juratores," 9 to support their call for reallocating preliminary
factfinding power. They advocated preservation of the jury's
factfinding function by allowing the jury to determine preliminary
facts that did not present technical questions beyond the jury's
capability.70
C. The Response to the Criticisms of the Early American
View-The Emergence of the Conditional Relevancy Doctrine
At first, only a few courts responded to these criticisms of the
early American view. The Supreme Court of Maine, in Winslow v.
Bailey,71 was one of the first courts to respond. Winslow sold a
parcel of land to Bailey in exchange for Bailey's promissory note.
When Bailey defaulted on the note, Winslow brought an action
against Bailey to collect. Bailey defended on the theory that Wins-
low had fraudulently induced him to enter into the contract, alleg-
ing that Winslow had falsely told him that the land was well tim-
bered. At trial, Bailey established that little timber grew on the
land. Bailey then attempted to introduce into evidence a certificate
stating that "10,000 feet of the best quality of pine timber to the
acre" grew on the land.7 2 Bailey claimed that during his negotia-
tions with Winslow, Winslow had showed him the certificate to
convince him that the tract was good timber land. Winslow ob-
jected when Bailey proffered the certificate, and contended that
the trial judge should determine the preliminary factual question
whether Winslow had displayed the certificate during the
Pa. 1980) (restricts); 1 D. LouisEL. & C. MuELLE, supra note 20, § 29, at 213-14
(preempts); id. at 242 (diminishes); J. MAGumn, supra note 39, at 220 (usurps); J. WIGMORE,
supra note 47, § 2550, at 650 n.4 (limits); Seidelson, supra note 28, at 1055 (destroys); Trav-
ers, An Essay on the Determination of Relevancy Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
1977 Amz. ST. L.J. 327, 343 (compromises).
69. "Judges do not answer questions of fact, jurors do not answer questions of law." See
J. THAYER, A PEumARy TREATISE ON EVMENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 185-87 (1898); J.
WIGMORE, supra note 47, § 2549, at 640.
70. See N.Y. CODE OF EvIDENcE § 104 (proposed 1982); Kaus, supra note 65, at 252.
71. 16 Me. 319 (1839). For additional discussion of Winslow, see Maguire & Epstein,
supra note" 29, at 395-96.
72. 16 Me. at 321.
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negotiations. 3
The trial judge initially was reluctant to admit the certificate but
eventually did so over Winslow's objection. 4 The judge also in-
structed the jury that "if [you] were not satisfied . . . that [the
certificate] had been used to induce the defendant to make the
purchase... it would not be evidence in the case. '7 5 On appeal,
the state supreme court upheld the trial judge's decision. 7 The ap-
pellate court expressed its belief that the jury could determine the
simple factual question posed by Winslow's objection.7
In Patton v. Bank of Lafayette,7 8 the Georgia Supreme Court
reached the same result as the court in Winslow. In Patton, the
plaintiff sued to collect on a promissory note, and the defendant
contended that an indorsement on the note was not authentic.7 In
his instructions to the jurors, the trial judge declared that the issue
of the indorsement's authenticity was
in the first instance... addressed to the court. The court, hav-
ing heard certain evidence relating to the question, admits this
note in evidence before you; but it is still a question of fact with
you whether or not you find that [the person sought to be
charged with liability] did or did not endorse this paper.8 0
Commenting on the trial judge's instruction, the appellate court
stated that only slight evidence is needed to authenticate a writing
and that the trial judge determines the sufficiency of the propo-
nent's evidence."'
Despite scattered decisions such as Winslow and Patton, the En-
glish practice prevailed in America well into the twentieth century.
Commentators did not advance a new theory of preliminary
factfinding until the 1920's.82 An article written in 1929 by Profes-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 319.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 321-23.
77. Id. at 322-23.
78. 124 Ga. 965, 53 S.E. 664 (1906). For additional discussion of Patton, see Maguire &
Epstein, supra note 29, at 395-96.
79. 124 Ga. at 966, 53 S.E. at 665.
80. Id. at 972, 53 S.E. at 667.
81. Id.
82. Laughlin, supra note 67, at 286; Saltzburg, supra note 29, at 272 n.3.
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sor Morgan was particularly influential in developing an alterna-
tive to the traditional English rule.83 Much of the terminology of
the modern doctrine of conditional relevancy originated with Mor-
gan's article.
The doctrine of conditional relevancy introduced a dichotomy
into preliminary factfinding procedures. The early American view
was unitary and decreed that the trial judge finally resolved all
preliminary facts." In contrast, Morgan's theory bifurcated the
preliminary factfinding procedure.85 The theory posits two comple-
mentary sets of procedures-one for determining preliminary facts
conditioning the competence of evidence, and a second for deter-
mining facts conditioning only the logical relevance of evidence.88
Figure 1 illustrates the two sets of procedures.
1. Competence
Morgan defined the concept of competence broadly. Under his
theory, competence extends to every reason for excluding logically
relevant evidence, including the hearsay rule, the best evidence
rule, the opinion rule, and privileges.8" Despite differences among
these rules,88 they all exclude probative evidence. That similarity
brings all four rules within the scope of Morgan's definition of
competence. Thus, at step 3 on Figure 1, if the trial judge con-
cludes that one of these evidentiary rules applies to a particular
83. Morgan, supra note 59. As subsequent commentators have noted, Morgan's analysis is
substantially identical to that of Maguire and Epstein, supra note 29. See Saltzburg, supra
note 29, at 271 n.2. The Morgan article is discussed here because of the more useful analyti-
cal framework it provides.
84. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., 1 D. LouisEL. & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 26, at 154; Saltzburg, supra
note 29, at 272 n.3.
86. J. MAGUIRE, supra note 39, at 229; J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, § 2550, at 641; Kaus,
supra note 65, at 233; Laughlin, supra note 67, at 286-87; Saltzburg, supra note 29, at 271
n.2; Note, Province of Judge and Jury in Determining Preliminary Questions of Fact in
New York, 23 N.Y.U. L. REv. 472, 473-74 (1948).
87. Morgan, supra note 59, at 165 n.2. See also CAL. Evm. CODE § 405 assembly commit-
tee comment (West 1966); Kaus, supra note 65, at 233.
88. The hearsay rule, the best evidence rule, and the opinion rule exclude evidence be-
cause of doubts about the reliability of the evidence. McCoRMICK, supra note 36, § 10, at
20. Privileges exclude evidence to foster confidential relationships. Id. § 72, at 152.
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Step 1: Identify the item of
proffered evidence.
I
Step 2: Identify the preliminary
facts that condition the
admissibility of the proffered
evidence.
Step 3: Characterize each
preliminary fact as one
conditioning either the relevance
or the competence of the proffered
evidence.
Relevance Competence
Step 4: The trial judge
decides whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to
sustain a finding that the
preliminary fact exists.
Step 5: The jurors determine
whether the preliminary fact
exists.
Step 4: As a trier of fact, the
trial judge determines
whether the preliminary fact
exists.
Step 5: If the preliminary fact
exists and coincides with a
fact on the merits, the trial
judge allows the jury to
resolve the factual issue
independently.
Figure 1. The Procedure for Determining Preliminary Facts That
Condition the Admissibility of Proffered Evidence
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preliminary fact, the judge would characterize the issue as one con-
ditioning the competence of evidence. 9
After determining that the preliminary fact question conditions
the competence of the proffered evidence, the trial judge would
hear foundational proof from both sides regarding the existence of
the preliminary fact. 0 Before the witness answers the question to
which the opponent has objected, the opponent may examine the
witness on voir dire outside of the jury's presence.,' After hearing
the voir dire and any extrinsic evidence the opponent desires to
present,9 2 the judge makes a final ruling on the objection 93 which
binds the jury. The judge does not resubmit the admissibility issue
to the jury, 4 and the parties may not ask the jury to redetermine
admissibility.9 5 The judge need not instruct the jury to disregard
the evidence if they should find that the preliminary fact does not
exist. The judge has ruled the evidence admissible.9
2. Conditional Logical Relevance
The second prong of Morgan's doctrine addresses conditional
logical relevance, a theory that allows the judge to admit conjunc-
tive or coordinate facts that cannot be proven simultaneously.97
When Item A and Item B considered separately are each irrele-
vant in absence of proof of the other, a relevancy objection may
be interposed to whichever one is offered first. But a party must
start somewhere. This rules requires the proponent merely to
bring forward evidence from which the truth of Item A could be
found, upon the representation that evidence of Item B will be
offered. Evidence of the conditionally relevant Item B can then
89. See supra Figure 1.
90. FED. R. Evm. 104 advisory committee note.
91. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5052, at 249.
92. Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 53, 55
(1965).
93. CAL. Evm. CODE § 405 assembly committee comment (West 1966).
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 29 (citing United States v.
Herrera, 407 F. Supp. 766, 771 (N.D. IM. 1975)).
96. N.Y. CODE OF EVIDENCE § 104(b) (proposed 1982); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 44, § 5053, at 261.
97. 1 D. Louismi & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 26, at 155; see also FED. R. Evm.
104(b); CAL. EvID. CODE § 403 (West 1966).
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be shown. The dispute as to the truth of each is ultimately for
the jury rather than the judge. But the order of proof is, as gen-
erally, for the judge .... He can decide whether to hear evi-
dence of Item A or of Item B first. . . .Whichever one he elects
to hear first will be admitted conditionally or, in the traditional
phraseology, de bene. If the proponent fails to make good on his
representation to offer sufficient evidence of the second item,
the evidence of the first will on motion be stricken and the jury
instructed to disregard it.98
A number of preliminary facts are typically characterized as con-
ditioning only the logical relevance of proffered evidence. For in-
stance, when the proponent proffers a document, a preliminary
fact conditioning the document's admissiblity is the document's
authenticity or genuineness. The common law does not accept
physical evidence, such as documents, at face value.99 The common
law is imbued with a spirit of skepticism, and holds that documen-
tary evidence is irrelevant unless the proponent authenticates the
document. 100 As the advisory committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence asserts, if the proponent offers "a letter purporting to be
from Y. . .to establish an admission by him, it has no probative
value unless [the proponent presents foundational proof that] Y
wrote or authorized it." 101 The courts also have applied the con-
cept of conditional relevance to such preliminary facts as notice of
the contents of a statement,10 2 the chain of custody for physical
evidence,103 the identification of the speaker of an oral state-
ment,10 4 the accuracy of a film, 1 05 and the authority of an agent to
98. ME. R. Evw. 104 advisor's note, reprinted in J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, § 2550, at
647-48. Accord FED. R. Evin. 901(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 1966).
99. McCoRMICK, supra note 36, §§ 218-219, at 543-45.
100. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 218, at 543. See generally Morgan, supra note 59, at
170-89.
101. FED. R. EviD. 104 advisory committee note. See also DuBois v. Sparrow, 92 CaL App.
3d 290, 296-97, 154 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720 (1979); C. WRuGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44,
§ 5054.
102. See supra note 101.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Chaplinski, 579 F.2d 373, 374-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1050 (1978); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 772-73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 981 (1978); see also 1 D. Louisau. & C. MuELLzR, supra note 20, § 31, at 116-17
(Supp. 1983).
104. See 1 D. LouismLL & C. MuELLE, supra note 20, § 31, at 223-26; cf. FED. R. Evm.
901(b)(5).
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speak for the party against whom an oral statement is offered.108
California Evidence Code § 403 contains the most detailed legisla-
tive list of preliminary facts conditioning pure logical relevance.10 7
If the judge classifies the preliminary fact as one conditioning
only logical relevance, the procedure for determining the prelimi-
nary fact's existence contrasts sharply with the procedure followed
if the preliminary fact conditions competence. If the preliminary
fact conditions the competence of the proffered evidence, the judge
listens to the evidence on both sides and determines the question
of the preliminary fact's existence0 8 and decides whether the pro-
ponent's foundational evidence is credible.109 If the preliminary
fact conditions logical relevance, however, the judge's role is much
narrower. The judge addresses only a question of law: whether the
evidence has sufficient probative value to sustain a rational jury
finding that the preliminary fact exists if the jury decides to be-
lieve the proponent's foundational evidence. 10 When the fact con-
ditions logical relevance, the jury determines the credibility of the
foundational evidence.111 The judge must accept the evidence at
face value and cannot inquire into the credibility of the founda-
tional evidence 112 unless the evidence is preposterous as a matter
of law. 1 If the proponent presents prima facie 114 foundational evi-
dence or some other foundational evidence sufficient to uphold a
rational jury finding,11 5 the judge must admit the proffered evi-
dence regardless of whether he thinks that the foundational proof
is credible."'
105. See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 668 (5th Cir. 1977); see also 1 D.
LousELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 31, at 116 (Supp. 1983).
106. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 assembly committee comment (West 1966).
107. See id. § 403. The list includes numerous facts that other jurisdictions characterize
as facts conditioning the competence of evidence. Kaus, supra note 65, at 235-45.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
109. Id.
110. See FED. R. Evm. 104(b); CAL. Evm. CODE § 403 (West 1966).
111. Seidelson, supra note 28, at 1059.
112. Morgan, supra note 59, at 182.
113. Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29, at 399.
114. See United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978); Maguire & Epstein,
supra note 29, at 410.
115. See C. WRiGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5054, at 269.
116. See United States v. 478.34 Acres of Land, 578 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir. 1978); 1 D.
LoUisEL & C. MuELLER, supra note 20, § 33, at 243-44; Kaus, supra note 65, at 235;
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As a corollary to the limited nature of the judge's inquiry under
the conditional relevance procedure, the judge may not have to lis-
ten to evidence on both sides before ruling on the objection.1
Some statutes expressly require the judge to listen to evidence on
both sides before ruling on objections, including those based en-
tirely on logical relevance. 118 The internal logic of the conditional
relevance concept, however, does not require that the judge listen
to the opponent's evidence before ruling." 9 The only question the
judge must answer is whether the proponent's evidence is suffi-
ciently probative to support a permissive inference of the prelimi-
nary fact's existence. 20 Because the judge ordinarily can answer
that question by considering only the proponent's evidence, a one-
sided presentation of foundational evidence is adequate. 2' The op-
ponent's contrary foundational evidence occasionally will be so
overwhelming that a rational jury could not reject it. 122 In the typi-
cal case, however, the opponent's contrary foundational evidence
will merely create a question of fact to be resolved by the jury. 23
Under the conditional relevance concept, the judge ordinarily can
force the opponent to argue the issue before the jurors. 24 Thus,
when the proponent's foundational evidence has sufficient proba-
tive value on its face, the judge will overrule the objection and ad-
mit the proffered evidence. 12 5 The opponent can present evidence
to dispute the preliminary fact later in the trial. 26 Under this pro-
cedure, the opponent's refutation evidence "bears on the weight,
Saltzburg, supra note 29, at 303.
117. State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 467-71, 623 P.2d 1095, 1099-1101 (1981); C.
WRoHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5053, at 263; Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29, at
400.
118. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, § 2550, at 646 n.4; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 44, § 5053, at 263-64.
119. State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 44, § 5053, at 263-64; Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29, at 400.
120. See FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
121. See supra note 119.
122. Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29, at 400. See also D. LouisLL & C. MuELLER,
supra note 20, § 506, at 25.
123. CAL. Evm. CODE § 403 assembly committee comment (West 1966).
124. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 1 901(a)[01].
125. See FED. R. Evm. 104(b).
126. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, % 901(a)[01]; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 44, § 5054, at 271.
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not the admissiblity, of [the proffered] evidence.1127
The procedures used to determine conditional relevance differ
from those used to determine competence in another respect.
When the judge follows the conditional relevance procedure, he as-
signs to the jury the task of determining the existence of the pre-
liminary fact.128 The jury makes the determination during its de-
liberations. Without any guidance from the judge, some jurors
might not know that they should resolve the question; conse-
quently, the jury should be instructed on the task.12 9
In summary, the conditional relevance procedures differ from
the competence procedures in three noteworthy respects. First,
under the conditional relevance procedure, the trial judge accepts
the proponent's foundational evidence at face value. The judge re-
solves only whether the foundational evidence has sufficient proba-
tive value as a matter of law to support a rational jury finding of
the preliminary fact's existence. Under the competence procedure,
the judge determines the credibility of the foundational evidence
and resolves the question of the preliminary fact's existence. Sec-
ond, under the conditional relevance procedure the judge some-
times listens only to the proponent's foundational evidence before
ruling. Under the competence procedure, the judge must hear the
foundational evidence on both sides before ruling. Finally, the
judge's ruling on a fact conditioning competence binds the jury,
and the judge need not instruct the jury about the preliminary
127. State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 467, 623 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1981).
128. See FED. R. Evm. 104 advisory committee note; DuBois v. Sparrow, 92 Cal. App 3d
290, 296-97, 154 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720 (1979); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5054,
at 265-66.
129. See generally Seidelson, supra note 28. Under the California Code, "[i]f the [judge]
admits the proffered evidence under this section, the [judge] may, and on request shall,
instruct the jury to determine whether the preliminary fact exists and to disregard the prof-
fered evidence unless the jury finds that the preliminary fact does not exist." CAL. Evm.
CODE § 403(c)(1) (West 1966). The March 1969 draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence con-
tained similar language, but the language was deleted from the 1971 draft. 1 D. LoUISELL &
C. MuELLE, supra note 20, § 26, at 159; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5051,
at 241-42; Seidelson, supra note 28, at 1048-50. Some commentators believe that the dele-
tion has no effect because the deleted language merely "stated the obvious." Id. at 1053.
Others have concluded that the deletion gives the judge discretion to give the instruction,
see 1 D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 26, at 159, or requires the judge to give
the instruction only when omitting the instructions would prejudice the opposing party, see
Seidelson, supra note 28, at 1055, 1070.
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fact. When the fact conditions only logical relevance, the judge
often will charge the jurors that they must determine the prelimi-
nary fact's existence and disregard the proffered evidence if they
find that the preliminary fact does not exist.
D. The Criterion for Allocating a Preliminary Fact to the Judge
Rather Than the Jury
Although the conditional relevance concept is the dominant cur-
rent view,130 contemporary courts and commentators disagree on
many points. For example, the scope of the constitutional right to
a jury trial 31 is unsettled, and the extent to which the constitu-
tional right limits the freedom of courts and legislatures to allocate
preliminary factfnding power to the judge is unclear. 32 In addi-
tion, commentators have assailed the concept of conditional logical
relevance.3 3 Professor Ball has argued persuasively that the con-
cept is unsound'34 and that conditional relevance is fundamentally
inconsistent with the modern understanding of logical relevance.3 5
The advocates of conditional relevance contend that, in the case of
conjunctive propositions of fact, proof of one fact is wholly irrele-
vant without proof of the other.' Ball attacks this contention by
arguing that proof of either fact-even in isolation-satisfies the
minimal modern standard of logical relevance.13 7 Even courts and
commentators subscribing to the conditional relevance theory fre-
quently disagree over the classification of a fact as one condition-
ing relevance of competence.'3s Professor Morgan and subsequent
commentators have provided useful rules of classification, 39 but
the distinction between the two prongs of the dichotomy is some-
130. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REv. 435, 436, 438 (1980);
Laughlin, supra note 67, at 286.
131. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VIL
132. See United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d 218, 219 (1st Cir. 1981); J. THAYER, supra
note 69, at 185-97; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5053; Morgan, supra note 59,
at 186-88.
133. J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, § 2550, at 651 n.4; Ball, supra note 130, at 446-69.
134. Ball, supra note 130.
135. Id. at 446-54.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Kaus, supra note 65, at 237.
139. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5053, at 260.
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times obscure.140 Finally, even if the judge should determine a pre-
liminary fact, the question remains whether the judge should re-
solve the issue by a preponderance of the evidence or a higher
standard, such as clear and convincing evidence.141
Notwithstanding the extensive disagreements, courts and com-
mentators agree on one critical point: the question of a preliminary
fact's existence should be resolved by the judge when a material
risk exists that the foundational evidence will affect the jury's de-
liberations even if the jury determines that the preliminary fact
does not exist.1 42 Courts and commentators, however, often cite the
jury's ability to disregard evidence after a decision of the prelimi-
nary fact's nonexistence as a justification for allocating the prelimi-
nary fact to the jury.1 43 Technical questions may be troublesome to
the jury, but lay jurors can reason and apply logic.
Assume, for example, that the proffered evidence is a document
and that the preliminary fact is the document's authenticity. Sup-
pose further that, during its deliberations, the jury decides that the
letter is a forgery. Using common sense, the jury can understand
readily that the letter has no probative value in the case.244 They
naturally will follow an instruction to disregard the letter if the
letter is not authentic.145 The risk that the letter will affect the
jury's deliberations after the jurors conclude that the letter is not
authentic is negligible 46 because any rational juror will disregard a
forged letter. 147 Consequently, the trial judge safely can entrust the
decision to the lay jurors.148 In some cases, the evidence's irrele-
vance may be so patent that the judge hardly needs to instruct the
jury.149
140. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 104[01].
141. Saltzburg, supra note 29. See People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929
(1982) (prescribing clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof for the admissi-
bility of hypnotically enhanced testimony).
142. 1 D. Louisnmu & C. MumpayR, supra note 20, § 26, at 157.
143. C. WIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5054, at 266-67.
144. Laughlin, supra note 67, at 305-07; Travers, supra note 68, at 343; see also Kaplan,
supra 27, at 1005.
145. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 104[02].
146. Travers, supra note 68, at 343.
147. Laughlin, supra note 67, at 305-07; see also Kaplan, supra note 27, at 999, 1008.
148. Travers, supra note 68, at 344.
149. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 assembly committee comment (West 1966).
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Courts and commentators, however, also frequently cite the risk
that the jury will disregard the judge's instruction as a reason to
assign the preliminary fact to the judge.1 0 Assume, for example,
that an objection is made on the basis of privilege and that the
admissibility of the evidence depends on whether a third party was
present during a conversation between an attorney and client. As-
sume further that the judge instructs the jurors that the privilege
attaches and that the jurors must disregard the privileged commu-
nication during their deliberations if they find that no third party
was present. A material risk exists that the jury will not disregard
the communication even if it concludes that the communication
was privileged.81 If testimony about the communication is
presented to the jury, the jurors will have difficulty expunging the
testimony from their minds. 2 Although the testimony is techni-
cally inadmissible, the jurors have heard the testimony, and may
be subconsciously affected. 5 s The judge's instruction to disregard
the evidence will be ineffective;TM even a rational juror acting in
good faith may not be able to honor the instruction.85 The impact
of the testimony probably will color the jury's deliberations.5
Even the most ardent proponents of the conditional relevance
concept recognize this consideration as a legitimate basis for com-
mitting a preliminary fact to the judge's final determination. Pro-
fessor Morgan acknowledged that, in dividing factfinding responsi-
bility between the judge and the jury, a critical factor is whether
the jury can realistically disregard the proffered evidence after
finding the preliminary fact's nonexistence. 57 Morgan posited
cases in which jurors acting in good faith could not ignore the
150. See, e.g., 1 D. LouIsm. & C. MuEuR, supra note 20, § 26, at 157.
151. The privilege sometimes excludes information highly relevant to the merits of the
case. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 72, at 152. The exclusion of information is the price that
society pays for the privilege.
152. J. MAGUME, supra note 39, at 212; 1 J. WaiNsrmN & M. BERGE, supra note 20, 1
104102]; Seidelson, supra note 28, at 1057.
153. Kaus, supra note 65, at 249.
154. 1 D. Louismi. & C. MumZxR, supra note 20, § 29, at 83 (Supp. 1983).
155. Travers, supra note 68, at 344.
156. See, e.g., United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
917 (1979); 1 D. LouIsEu & C. MUpLLER, supra note 20, § 29, at 81 (Supp. 1983); Laughlin,
supra note 67, at 311.
157. Morgan, supra note 59, at 168-69.
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foundational evidence and eliminate its effect from their delibera-
tions.158 The California Evidence Code represents the most ex-
treme implementation of the conditional relevance concept.159
Nevertheless, the Law Revision Commission comment to Califor-
nia Evidence Code § 405 recognizes that the jury's inability to dis-
regard proffered evidence is a sound reason for assigning to the
judge the task of determining the existence of preliminary facts
that condition the admission of the proffered evidence. The Com-
mission favored assigning the fact to the judge whenever "it is un-
realistic to expect a jury to perform such a feat."1 0
III. THE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF
PRELIMINARY FACTS CONDITIONING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE-THE PRELIMINARY FACTS OF THE VALIDITY
OF THE UNDERLYING SCIENTIFIC THEORY OR PRINCIPLE
In a jurisdiction that has abandoned the Frye rule, the propo-
nent of scientific evidence need not show that the underlying sci-
entific principle is generally accepted. 61 The proponent, however,
must establish the validity of the underlying scientific principle or
theory." 2 The principle's validity is as essential to the probative
value of scientific evidence as the authenticity of a document is to
the document's probative worth.163 The logical relevance doctrine
requires validation of the underlying scientific principle just as it
mandates authentication of a proffered document.'" The validity
of the underlying principle, therefore, is a preliminary fact that
conditions the admissibility of the scientific evidence.6 5
Until recently, the majority rule was that the trial judge should
determine the existence of this preliminary fact. 66 If the opponent
presented contrary foundational evidence, a judge usually would
158. Id. at 168, 176.
159. Kaus, supra note 65, at 235-45.
160. CAL. Evm. CODE § 405 assembly committee comment (West 1966).
161. State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 466-67, 623 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1981).
162. FnD. R. Evm. 901(b)(9).
163. E. Imwi mID, P. GwmNNLLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERR, supra note 37, at 84-88.
164. Id.
165. E. Im WmILR D, supra note 32, at 92.
166. See People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); Strong, supra
note 17, at 4.
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hear evidence on both sides before ruling on the opponent's objec-
tion.16 7 In some cases, appellate courts held that submission of the
preliminary fact of the principle's validity to the jury was incor-
rect.168 In a leading voiceprint identification case, for example, the
trial judge submitted the question of the validity of sound spec-
trography to the jury in his final charge.169 The appellate court
tersely commented that "[tihis is an incorrect statement of the
law .... ,,170
The majority rule, however, has recently been questioned. In
State v. Kersting,71 the Oregon Court of Appeals discussed the
debate over the Frye rule and the procedural consequences of the
Frye rule's abolition. The court posited a general reliability test
that could be substituted for the Frye test.17 2 The court indicated
that, if the reliability test governs, the trial judge's only task is to
determine whether "a competent expert [has] testifie[d] that the
scientific process in question is reliable .. ."17- If the record con-
tains such testimony, the judge admits the proffered scientific evi-
dence. 4 The opponent then may present refutation evidence to
the jury, attacking the weight, but not the admissibility, of the evi-
dence.""' Finally, "[e]ach factfinder would then be called upon to
determine, in the course of its deliberation, the validity of the par-
ticular scientific process. "176
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence may accelerate
the trend toward this minority view.1 77 The rules support an argu-
ment that the jury should determine the validity of the theory or
principle underlying proffered scientific evidence. Rule 901 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence1 78 is the key to the argument. Rule
167. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976);
Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 31, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1982).
168. See, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
169. Id. at 459-61, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
170. Id. at 459, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
171. 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981).
172. Id. at 466-67, 623 P.2d at 1099.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 468-69, 623 P.2d at 1100.
177. 1 J. WFJNSTFm & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 104113].
178. FED. R. EvID. 901.
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901(a) restates the conditional relevance procedure: "The require-
ment of authentication or identification as a condition precedent
to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
17 9
Rule 901(b) then provides illustrations of preliminary facts gov-
erned by 901(a).180 Rule 901(b)(9) states that the proponent of evi-
dence generated by a "process or system" must validate the pro-
cess or system by "showing that the process or system produces an
accurate result."""s The phrase "process or system" is expansive
enough to include scientific instruments or techniques. Moreover,
several leading commentators interpret rule 901(b)(9) as applying
to indisputably scientific evidence such as computer output,18 2
electrocardiograms,1 83 electroencephalograms, 8 radar,85 and sta-
tistical proof. ' These commentaries and Kersting18 7 require con-
sideration of whether the judge or the jury should determine the
validity of the theory or principle underlying proffered scientific
evidence if the Frye rule is abolished.
This Article maintains that the preliminary fact of a theory's va-
lidity should be determined by the judge. As noted earlier, 8 virtu-
ally all authorities agree that the trial judge should resolve prelimi-
nary fact questions if a material risk exists that the foundational
evidence will affect the jury's deliberations after the jury has de-
cided that the preliminary fact does not exist. That risk always
would be present if the jury determined the validity of the scien-
tific theory.
A. The Nature of the Foundational, Experimental Evidence
Presented to Validate the Underlying Scientific Theory
The authentication of most types of evidence is an all-or-nothing
179. Id. 901(a).
180. See id. 901(b).
181. Id. 901(b)(9).
182. See D. Louisu & C. MuELLER, supra note 20, § 522, at 142 n.44.
183. See id. n.45.
184. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 901(b)(9)[01].
185. Id.
186. See D. LOuisELL & C. MUE LER, supra note 20, § 522, at 143 n.47.
187. 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 150-60.
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proposition. Generally, the two possibilities are mutually exclusive:
a letter is either genuine or fake; a pistol either is or is not the
weapon found at the crime scene; the voice on a tape recording
either is or is not the defendant's voice. When the choices facing
the jury are that stark and categorical, the jury will disregard the
proffered evidence if the jury finds that the preliminary fact does
not exist. If a letter is fake, the jury naturally will disregard it in
deciding whether the defendant accepted the plaintiff's offer to
enter into a long-term contract. Similarly, if a pistol is not the
weapon found at the crime scene, the jury ordinarily will set aside
the testimony about the pistol in deciding the defendant's guilt or
innocence. If the existence of the preliminary fact is an absolute
proposition and the jury finds that the fact does not exist, the
jury's natural, common sense inclination will be to ignore the foun-
dational testimony.
The foundational proof of a scientific principle's validity, how-
ever, differs qualitatively from the foundational evidence used to
authenticate most types of conditionally relevant evidence. The va-
lidity of a scientific principle is not an absolute proposition. A sci-
entist approaches a problem by first formulating a hypothesis
about its solution, and then attempts to validate the hypothesis by
conducting an experiment.18 9 The scientist tries to determine
whether the hypothesis accounts for the data generated by the ex-
periment.190 One type of experiment is a validity study.1 91 The pur-
pose of a validity study is to determine the accuracy of a scientific
technique-that is, whether the technique does what its propo-
nents claim. 92 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(9), by mandating a
showing "that the process or system produces an accurate re-
sult"193 requires a validity study.
Validity studies often reveal a margin of error.194 Consider the
validity studies of polygraphy and sound spectrography. One of the
best known articles on polygraph evidence surveys the scientific
189. E. SNYDER, HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 38 (1969).
190. Id.
191. Abrams, Polygraphy, in Scmnmmc AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 755, 791-99 (E. Im-
winkelried 2d ed. 1981); Giannelli, supra note 6, at 1201 n.20.
192. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 1201 n.20.
193. FED. R. EVIn. 901(b)(9).
194. Abramns, supra note 191, at 791-99.
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literature and reports that, in the published laboratory experi-
ments, the accuracy of polygraph diagnoses of deception is eighty-
one percent. 95 Dr. Oscar Tosi's research on sound spectrography
disclosed a margin of error in that scientific technique as well.196 In
tests in which examiners were forced to decide whether the same
voice produced two different spectrograms, the examiners made er-
roneous identifications in six percent of the cases.197 Although both
polygraphs and sound spectrography are far from infallible, a num-
ber of courts have found these techniques sufficiently valid to be
admissible.9 8 In these cases, the validating foundational evidence
is probabilistic, rather than categorical.199 The experimental pro-
cess may disclose a margin of error reflecting the percentage of
cases in which a qualified, careful analyst employing the technique
will reach an incorrect conclusion. The validation of a scientific
theory, therefore, is not an absolute proposition. Although the ex-
perimental data is likely to reveal that the technique usually
works, the technique may occasionally misfire.
Suppose that the proponent proffers evidence of a new tech-
nique for analyzing blood. The proponent's expert witness testifies
that the margin of error is fifty-one percent. Use of the technique,
therefore, will lead to an accurate result in less than half the
cases-an accuracy level below pure chance. Assume that the judge
assigns to the jury the task of determining the theory's validity. In
this situation, the jurors probably will find that the technique is
invalid and that the preliminary fact does not exist. The jury, how-
ever, may be unable to disregard the testimony about the scientific
technique. The jurors know that the technique works sometimes;
the foundational testimony indicates that the technique often
works. The proponent's expert may be eminently qualified, one of
the preeminent authorities in the field. The jurors may be tempted
195. See generally Abram§, Polygraph Validity and Reliability: A Review, 18 J. FORENSIC
SCL 313 (1973).
196. Comment, The Status of Voiceprints as Admissible Evidence, 24 SYRACUSE L. Rnv.
1261, 1269 (1973).
197. Id.
198. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCmNTmic EvDENcE IN CRmuNAL CASES § 14.10 (2d
ed. 1978). Decisions admitting sound spectrography include: United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500
(Me. 1978); and State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983).
199. E. ImwINaELRE, THE MEMODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTMIC EVIDENCE 146-47 (1982).
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to conclude that the expert's exceptional credentials compensate
for the technique's margin of error. Although the jurors might find
that the fifty-one percent error margin renders the technique inva-
lid, subconsciously they might suspect that the superbly qualified
expert on the stand could make the technique work. Thus, the
jury's ability to disregard the evidence is doubtful, even if the
technique's accuracy rate is less than the level of chance.
The doubts increase if the scientific technique in question has a
high accuracy rate. Several jurisdictions admit polygraph and
sound spectrography evidence,00 two techniques with documented
accuracy rates exceeding eighty percent.201 The vast majority of ju-
risdictions, however, exclude these two techniques despite the
seemingly impressive accuracy rates. If the jury is assigned the
task of determining the validity of the underlying scientific princi-
ple, the jury will have to grapple with the threshold problem of
defining the concept of validity.20 2 The trial judge might decide to
help the jury by informing them of the accuracy rates of scientific
techniques that courts in the jurisdiction have previously found
unacceptable. 203 For example, if the issue arose in a jurisdiction
barring polygraph evidence, the judge might inform the jury that
the state's courts have rejected the polygraph technique despite
the technique's high accuracy rate.2 0' In this variation of the hypo-
thetical, the jury may find the equally accurate blood technique
invalid and yet be unable to disregard the evidence effectively. On
the one hand, because the technique's accuracy rate is comparable
to polygraphy-a technique excluded in the jurisdiction-the jury
may feel compelled to find the blood technique invalid. On the
other hand, the jury knows that the technique has an accuracy rate
much higher than chance. The jurors not only know that the tech-
nique works sometimes; the jurors realize that the technique works
in the overwhelming majority of cases. The jurors may be unable
200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 195-96.
202. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 198, §§ 12.07, 14.10. See also Cornett v. State,
33 CRIm. L. REP. (BNA) 2342 (Ind. Sup. Ct. July 1, 1983).
203. Dean Wigmore, however, has cautioned against "cumber[ing]" the jury with legal
definitions. J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, § 2550, at 663.
204. The judge might judicially notice the accuracy rate of the scientific techniques previ-
ously excluded by the jurisdiction's courts. See FED. R. Evin. 201(b), (g).
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to banish this evidence from their minds even if they find that the
preliminary fact does not exist. This difficulty is unique to the
probabilistic nature of the experimental foundational evidence
used to validate scientific techniques.
B. The Time and Effort the Jurors Often Spend Analyzing the
Foundational Evidence Before Determining the Existence of the
Preliminary Fact of the Technique's Validity
Because of its probabilistic character, the foundational evidence
of a scientific technique's validity is different in both kind and de-
gree from the categorical foundational proof typically used to au-
thenticate other types of evidence. In the typical case, the jury
must expend more time and effort to understand a scientific foun-
dation. The expenditure strengthens the memory of the founda-
tional evidence and increases the risk that the jurors will be unable
to ignore the evidence once they conclude that the preliminary fact
does not exist.
Lay jurors undoubtedly expend more energy attempting to un-
derstand scientific evidence than they do in comprehending more
routine types of evidence. Scientific evidence is a type of expert
testimony. The rationale for admitting expert testimony is that the
expert's knowledge or skill enables the expert to draw inferences
beyond a lay person's capability.205 Courts often assert that to be
admissible, expert testimony must relate to a subject beyond the
understanding of lay people.20 6 Thus, whenever a party proffers
scientific evidence, the initial premise is that the evidence relates
to a topic that jurors will have difficulty comprehending. Although
proponents may use trial techniques, such as audiovisual aids, to
simplify the scientific evidence for the jury, the proffered scientific
proof will not qualify as expert evidence unless the proof relates to
a subject beyond the common knowledge and experience of lay ju-
rors. 207 If a conscientious juror labors at understanding the scien-
205. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, governing expert testimony, refers to "scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge." FED. R. Evm. 702.
206. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 13.
207. Cf. id. ([Courts will admit expert opinion concerning matters about which the ju-
rors may have general knowledge if the expert opinion would still aid their understanding of
the fact issue.").
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tific foundational evidence and nevertheless concludes that the
preliminary fact does not exist, that juror will have difficulty ban-
ishing the evidence from his memory. The more intently the juror
attempts to grasp the meaning of the evidence, the more indelible
the impression that the evidence will leave on the juror's mind.20
The significant amount of courtroom time devoted to scientific
proof compounds the risk that the juror will be unable to disregard
the evidence. A routine foundation for authenticating a document
may be very brief. Using lay testimony, such as the testimony of a
person familiar with the purported author's handwriting style, the
proponent can authenticate a document in one or two minutes. 0
If the proponent resorts to scientific proof, however, laying the
foundation is likely to be much more time consuming. Litigating a
scientific technique's validity can consume hours of courtroom tes-
timony and hundreds of pages of trial transcript.21 0 Understanda-
bly, when jurors listen to hours of foundational scientific proof,
they will have difficulty ignoring the proof during their delibera-
tions once they find that the preliminary fact does not exist.
The psychological literature on memory suggests the same con-
clusions. If a person processes information thoroughly, his memory
of that information will be stronger.21 Although the extent of
processing is not directly proportional to the difficulty of compre-
hension, the person's struggle to understand the information may
enhance the depth of processing, and that greater depth should
make the memory stronger. Similarly, increasing the temporal du-
ration of exposure to a stimulus tends to solidify the memory of
that stimulus. 21 2 Prolonged exposure partially accounts for the
208. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 36.
209. R. KEETON, BASIC EXPRESSIONS FOR TRIAL LAWYERS 17-19 (1979); J. WALTz & J.
KAPLAN, EVIDENCE-AKING THE REcORD 40-43 (1982).
210. E. IMwINKERUED, supra note 199, at 82; D. LoUIsELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20,§ 522, at 146-47; Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 36. In a case involving a challenge to the
admissibility of radar speedmeter evidence, the trial judge "heard over 2,000 pages of testi-
mony and arguments." State v. Aquilera, 25 Clm. L. REP. (BNA) 2189 (Fla. County Ct.,
May 7, 1979).
211. L HUNTER, MEMORY 24-25 (1966). For general discussions of the concept of levels of
processing, see R. KLATKY, HuMAN MEMORr. STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 21-26 (2d ed.
1980); E. ZECHMEISTER & S. NYBERG, HumA MEMORY. AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND
THEORY (1982). Zechmeister and Nyberg point out that the memory of information is likely
to be more durable if a person subjects the information to deeper analysis. Id. at 254.
212. I. HUNTER, supra note 211, at 142; N. SPEAR, THE PROCESSING OF MEMORIES: FORGET-
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phenomenon that repetition makes the memory of information less
subject to decay.213 If a conscientious juror makes an earnest effort
to understand four hours of foundational scientific testimony, the
juror would be virtually unable to disregard the testimony com-
pletely during the final deliberations. The juror may forget many
of the details of the testimony,214 but the overall impression left by
the testimony will be difficult to repress.
Combined with the probabilistic nature of a scientific founda-
tion, the psychological difficulty of this task compels the conclu-
sion that the trial judge should determine the validity of the the-
ory underlying proffered scientific evidence. Even the most
committed devotees of conditional relevance concede that the
judge should make the final decision if an intolerable risk exists
that the jury could not disregard the foundational testimony dur-
ing deliberations.215 That risk exists every time the jury undertakes
to determine the preliminary fact of a scientific theory's validity.
IV. THE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING THE PRELIMINARY FACT OF
THE VALIDITY OF THE UNDERLYING SCIENTIFIC THEORY UNDER THE
FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
Even if the trial judge, as a matter of policy, should determine
the preliminary fact of a scientific theory's validity, the judge may
not be able to do so under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 104
specifies the procedures for determining preliminary facts in fed-
eral courts and in the twenty-four states that have adopted the
federal rules. 216 The rule incorporates the relevancy-competence
dichotomy. Rule 104(a) prescribes the procedure for determining
facts conditioning the competence of proffered evidence: "Prelimi-
nary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a wit-
ness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
T]NG AND RENTION 145 (1978); Nodine, The Role of Temporal Variables in the Acquisi-
tion of Concepts, in CONCEPTS AND THE STRUCTURE OF MEMORY 227, 230, 238 (B. Kleinmuntz
ed. 1967).
213. Chabot, Miller & Juola, The Relationship Between Repetition and Depth of
Processing, 4 MEMORY & COGNMON 677, 682 (1976); see also E. LoITus, EyTwrrNEss TEsTI-
MONY 23-24 (1979).
214. .HUNTER, supra note 211, at 132.
215. See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
216. See FED. R. Evm. 104; see also supra note 23.
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shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of sub-
division (b). 217 Subdivision (b) codifies the conditional relevance
procedure: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the ful-
fillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing of the fulfillment of the condition."2 18 Whether the preliminary
fact of a scientific theory's validity falls under subdivision (a) or
subdivision (b) is a complex question. Unraveling that question ne-
cessitates an analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 901, 611, and
403.
A. Rule 901's Allocation of Responsibility for Preliminary
Factfinding
As previously noted, rule 901 may be interpreted to require that
the jury determine the validity of the principle or theory underly-
ing proffered scientific evidence.219 Two conceivable methods of
undercutting that interpretation are available. First, one might ar-
gue that rule 901 does not apply to scientific evidence. A second
argument is that the rule 901 requirement of a showing sufficient
to support a finding of the theory's validity establishes a floor,
rather than a ceiling, leaving the trial judge free to add the re-
quirement that the proponent establish the principle's validity by
a preponderance of the evidence.
1. Rule 901's Applicability to Scientific Evidence
A proponent of allowing the judge, rather than the jury, to make
the determination of a theory's validity could properly charge that
rule 901(b)(9) is an ambiguous, poorly conceived provision. That
subsection states that, when evidence of a process or system is of-
fered, the proponent must present foundational proof "describing
a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result. ' 2 0 The drafters
could have clarified that language by defining the provision's rela-
tionship to the subjects of expert testimony in general and scien-
217. FED. R. Evm. 104(a).
218. Id. 104(b).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 171-87.
220. FED. R. Evm. 901(b)(9).
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tific evidence in particular. Furthermore, the Advisory Commit-
tee's note221 is relatively unhelpful. The Committee gives only two
examples of the provision's scope, asserting that rule 901(b)(9) ap-
plies to x-rays and computers.22 Even more disturbing, the Com-
mittee miscites authority. The Committee lists a number of cases
and articles concerning computers,223 but on close scrutiny, none of
the cited authorities supports the proposition that the validity of
the computer technique is a preliminary fact for the jury's deci-
sion; the authorities deal primarily with hearsay objections to com-
puter evidence.224 Some of the authorities contemplate a voir dire
of the proponent's witness125 or a final finding by the judge,228 pro-
cedures appropriate when the preliminary fact conditions the com-
petence of the proffered evidence, rather than its logical
relevance.2 7
Whatever the weakness of rule 901(b)(9) may be, the most sensi-
ble interpretation is that the rule applies to the preliminary fact of
a scientific principle's validity. The text and context of the rule
favor this interpretation. Although the phrase "process or system,"
is indefinite, "process" is broad enough to include scientific
processes,228 and "system" is expansive enough to encompass scien-
tific instruments. 29 One can fault the Advisory Committee for mis-
reading the cited authorities, but the Committee's note definitely
manifests an intent that the language would apply to x-ray and
221. Id. advisory committee note.
222. Id.
223. The note cites: Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433, 440 P.2d 314
(1968); State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629 (1968); Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib,
178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965); Freed, Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, 16 AM.
Jun. PROOF OF FACTS 273; Symposium, Law and Computers in the Mid-Sixties, ALI-ABA
(1966); and Comment, Computer Print-Outs of Business Records and Their Admissibility
in New York, 31 ALBANY L. Rnv. 61 (1976).
224. Every decision cited in supra note 223 deals with hearsay, rather than authentication
objections.
225. Freed, supra note 223, at 313.
226. Comment, supra note 223, at 72.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
228. A "process" is "a particular method of doing something, producing something, or
accomplishing a specific result." WEBST 'S THIRD NE w INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1808 (P.
Gove ed. 1969).
229. A "system" is any "group of devices or artificial objects ... used for a common
purpose." Id. at 2322.
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computer evidence. 30 X-rays and computers are indisputably sci-
entific techniques. 31 If the statute applies to those techniques,
other scientific techniques must also be included within the scope
of the rule. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not single out any
type of scientific evidence, even the maligned polygraph,232 for spe-
cial treatment. Given the examples in the Committee's note, one
may reasonably infer that the drafters intend the rule to apply to
any other variety of scientific evidence, including the electrocardio-
gram,233  electroencephalogram, 23  radar,235  and statistical
evidence."'
Like the text, the context of rule 901(b)(9) suggests that the rule
applies to the preliminary fact of the underlying scientific theory's
validity. The context of a statute or rule sheds light on its mean-
ing'37 because the context requires consideration of other portions
of the statutory or regulatory scheme. 238 For that reason, rule
901(b)(9) should be construed together with the other subsections
of rule 901(b). Those subsections include such logical relevance
problems as the authentication of writings. 3 9 The probative value
of scientific evidence depends on the validity of the underlying
theory just as a document's probative worth depends on the writ-
ing's genuineness. Rule 901(a) requires proof that proffered evi-
dence is "what its proponent claims."'2 40 A party offering a writing
claims explicitly or implicitly that the writing is authentic. In the
same fashion, a party offering scientific evidence claims explicitly
230. FED. R. Evm. 901 advisory committee note.
231. See D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE § 5:02(2), at 5-31 (1982)
(computers); A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 198, § 11.05, at 523, § 11.12, at 557,
§ 17.09, at 683 (X-rays).
232. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 198, § 14.10, at 617 ("[Ihe prevailing judicial
attitude... is one of a general unwillingness on the part of appellate courts to approve the
admissibility of Polygraph test results as trial court evidence.").
233. D. LOUisELL & C. MuzuLaR, supra note 20, § 522, at 142; J. WmNsTEu & M. BER-
GER, supra note 20, 901(b)(9)[01].
234. J. WEiNsTEIN & M. BERGoF, supra note 20, 901(b)(9)[01].
235. Id.
236. D. LOtUSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 522, at 143.
237. 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973) [herein-
after cited as STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION].
238. Id.
239. See FED. R. EvW. 901(b)(1)-(4).
240. Id. 901(a).
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or implicitly that the technique used to generate the evidence is
accurate. By analogous reasoning, therefore, the proponent of sci-
entific evidence should be required to validate the claim. Constru-
ing rule 901(b)(9) to apply to scientific evidence ensures that it
serves the same purpose and function as the other subsections of
rule 901(b).
2. Rule 901(a) as a Floor Rather than a Ceiling
Assuming that rule 901(b)(9) applies to scientific evidence, we
must ask whether rule 901(a) requires that the preliminary fact of
the theory's validity be treated as a fact conditioning relevance. A
proponent of allowing the trial judge to determine the theory's va-
lidity might argue that the rule sets only a floor-a minimum re-
quired showing for the admission of scientific evidence. That inter-
pretation would permit the judge to impose additional
requirements, perhaps even to insist that the proponent establish
the theory's validity by a preponderance of the evidence. A propo-
nent of a judicial determination might attempt to bolster the argu-
ment by contending that rule 901(a) and rule 104(b) must serve
different functions. Rule 104(b), setting out the conditional rele-
vance procedure, obviously addresses the allocation of factfinding
authority between the judge and the jury.2 41 If rule 901(a) merely
restates the same procedure prescribed in rule 104(b), rule 901(a)
is surplusage. The law favors giving each part of a statutory or reg-
ulatory scheme independent effect.242 Courts, therefore, ordinarily
should reject the construction of a statutory or regulatory provi-
sion that renders a provision surplusage.2 4 3
As appealing as this argument may sound, it is fallacious. Ini-
tially, construing rule 901(a) as a minimum requirement is incon-
sistent with its language. The rule does not require at least enough
"evidence... to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims."'244 The rule expressly says that "[t]he
requirement of authentication ... as a condition precedent to ad-
241. Id. 104(b).
242. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 237, § 46.06.
243. Id.
244. Fp. R. Evm. 901(a).
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missiblity is satisfied by" that quantum of evidence. 245 Although
the trial judge may impose additional requirements, such as com-
pliance with the hearsay rule and the best evidence rule, if applica-
ble,24e the judge may not impose additional requirements as pre-
requisites to authentication. With respect to the authentication
doctrine, rule 901(a) creates a ceiling as well as a floor, the trial
court judge can require only the quantum of proof specified in the
rule to satisfy authentication, and the judge would have to overrule
an authentication objection if the proponent provided that quan-
tum. To some extent, this interpretation renders rules 104(b) and
901(a) redundant,247 but the maxim of avoiding redundant con-
structions is only a guide to legislative interpretation-not a posi-
tive rule of law.248 The courts should attach little weight to the
maxim in this context because rules 602249 and 1008250 also are re-
dundant when combined with rule 104(b).251 Congress obviously
was not overly concerned about redundancy. Thus, any redun-
dancy should not override the express language of rule 901(a).
Moreover, the intentional redundancy here is justified. Although
most jurisdictions adhere to the conditional relevance doctrine,25 2
courts often disagree over the classification of particular prelimi-
nary facts.253 The courts of one state may characterize a given fact
as one conditioning competence, although the same preliminary
fact in another jurisdiction is said to condition logical relevance. 2 "
In Wigmore's words, the authorities are in a sad state of varigated
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. Id. 801-805, 1001-1008.
247. Kaplan, supra note 27, at 996.
248. STATUTORY CoNsTRuCIoN, supra note 237, § 46.06.
249. Fm. R. Evm. 602.
250. Id. 1008.
251. See generally 1 D. LouisEu & C. MuELLR, supra note 20, § 26, at 155-56.
252. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
253. Disagreements arise over such factual classifications as whether the party heard the
statement sought to be introduced as an adoptive admission, Note, supra note 86, at 476,
the existence of a conspiracy when an alleged coconspirator's statements are offered against
a defendant, Saltzburg, supra note 29, at 303; Seidelson, supra note 28, at 1059-79; Note,
supra note 86, at 481, the authenticity of handwriting exemplars to be compared with a
questioned document, Morgan, supra note 59, at 173, and whether the party heard the
statement that allegedly charged the party with notice of a fact, J. MAGUME, supra note 39,
at 223; Maguire & Epstein, supra note 29, at 402.
254. Kaus, supra note 65.
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
inconsistency.2 55 Rule 901 may be technically redundant in light of
rule 104, but the repetition of the standard in rule 901(a) serves
the useful function of removing any question about the proper
classification of the preliminary facts catalogued in rule 901(b).
Few reported decisions have construed rule 901(b)(9). Conse-
quently, the argument that the statute prescribes that the fact of a
scientific theory's validity must be handled as a fact conditioning
logical relevance is unsettled. This interpretation, however, seems
to be the more sensible reading of the rule.
B. The Possibility of Shifting Responsibility to the Judge Under
Rule 611(a)
Although rule 901(b)(9) apparently commits the determination
of the theory's validity to the jury, rule 611(a) may allow the judge
to determine the validity at least in some cases. The rule instructs
the trial court judge to "exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as
to . . .make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth . ,,."' The argument would be that
shifting the determination to the judge is a change in the order of
presenting evidence. If the judge treats the fact as one conditioning
logical relevance, the opponent would present controverting evi-
dence to the jury.25 7 If the judge assumes the power to determine
the fact, the opponent first will present the contrary evidence to
the judge.2 58 If the judge rules the evidence admissible, the oppo-
nent may then present some or all of the same evidence to the jury
to attack the validity of the scientific technique.
In this strained sense, shifting the decision from the jury to the
judge is a change in the order of presenting evidence. The shift,
however, involves far more than a mere change in the order of
presenting evidence. On its face, rule 611(a) addresses the mode or
manner in which the evidence will be presented, and the order in
which the evidence will be presented. Assigning the decision to the
judge addresses an entirely different set of questions: to whom will
255. See Morgan, supra note 59, at 170.
256. FED. R. Evm. 611(a).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
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the foundational evidence be presented; and will the evidence be
presented to the jury at all. The New York Trial Lawyers Commit-
tee on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence embraced this in-
terpretation of rule 611(a).259 The Committee's report states that
"Rule 611(a) does not attempt to change or limit the judge's au-
thority with respect to the conduct of the trial."2 60 Rules 104 and
901 help to define the judge's authority vis-a-vis the jury. Using
rule 611(a) to override rule 104 and rule 901 would change the
judge's authority.2 1 Research reveals no case in which a court has
relied on rule 611(a) as authority for reallocating the determina-
tion of a preliminary fact from the jury to the judge. Reliance on
rule 611(a) for such authority would be a suspect expansion of the
statute's intended scope.
C. The Possibility of Shifting Responsibility to the Judge Under
Rule 403
If rule 611(a) does not allow the trial judge to determine the sci-
entific theory's validity, the only remaining possibility is Federal
Rule of Evidence 403.282 Rule 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 2 63
The broad language of rule 403 may allow the judge to determine a
theory's validity. In a sense, when the judge allows the opponent to
present contradictory foundational evidence to the judge rather
than to the jury, the. judge has excluded the foundational evidence
from the jury's consideration. Moreover, the judge may justify this
exclusion by citing one of the policy reasons listed in rule 403-the
danger of unfair prejudice. The Advisory Committee's note to rule
403 explains that the term "prejudice" in rule 403 has a technical
meaning. "Prejudice" denotes the tendency of an item of evidence
259. 3 J. WmNsTmN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 7 611[01].
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. FED. R. Evm. 403.
263. Id.
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to tempt the jury to decide the case on an improper basis.2 That
interpretation of "prejudice" under rule 403 is widely accepted.265
If the jury could not effectively disregard foundational evidence
after finding that the preliminary fact does not exist, the decision
may be made on an improper basis. Although inadmissible, the
foundational evidence still may affect the jury's deliberations and
influence the verdict.2 6 Hence, the judge would be excluding the
foundational evidence from the jury to prevent "prejudice" in the
very sense in which that term is used in rule 403.
Two powerful counterarguments, however, suggest that Rule 403
cannot be used to shift the preliminary decision from the jury to
the judge. The first is that rule 403 articulates substantive eviden-
tiary standards and is not merely a procedural rule. Rule 602, rule
901, and rule 1008, which serve procedural purposes, cross-refer-
ence rule 104 in the text or in the accompanying advisory commit-
tee note.26 7 The drafters manifested an intent that those rules
should prescribe preliminary factfnding procedure. Neither the
text of rule 403 nor the advisory committee note accompanying it
cross-references rule 104. In a handful of cases, the courts' applica-
tion of rule 403 has incidentally created novel trial procedures.26 8
For example, some courts have invoked rule 403 as a basis for im-
posing time limitations on the entire trial269 or on a particular
party's case. In these decisions, however, the courts are exclud-
ing outright evidence offered after the time limit; they are not sub-
stituting the judge as the trier of fact to determine the credibility
of evidence. Moreover, some commentators have challenged these
decisions on the ground that the time limit procedure cannot "be
justified by anything in the language of the rule or its legislative
264. Id. advisory committee note.
265. 2 D. LoumsuL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 126, at 16-18; J. WEINsTEm & M.
BERGER, supra note 20, 403[03]; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5215, at
275-81.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 208-14.
267. FED. R. Evm. 602, 901, 1008 & advisory committee notes.
268. See, e.g., United States v. Algie, 503 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1980), rev'd, 667 F.2d
569 (6th Cir. 1982); SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 77 F.R.D. 10 (D. Conn. 1977).
269. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 77 F.R.D. 10 (D. Conn. 1977).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Algie, 503 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1980), rev'd, 667 F.2d
569 (6th Cir. 1982).
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history." , 17 Finally, at least one court has refused to read rule 403
as authorizing a judge to deviate from procedures clearly pre-
scribed by another statute.7 2
Even if rule 403 can be used as a legitimate basis for departing
from the procedures specified in rules 104 and 901, rule 403 cannot
be used properly to reinstate a general rule that the trial judge
determines the preliminary fact of a scientific theory's validity.
Trial judges typically use rule 403 as authority to balance, on an ad
hoc basis, the probative value of an item of evidence against at-
tendant dangers. Treating rule 403 as a basis for formulating a
general rule applicable to an entire category of cases would put
rule 403 at odds with rule 402.273 Rule 402 provides that any rele-
vant evidence is admissible in federal cases "except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Con-
gress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority."2'74 The list omits case law,
and the legislative history of rule 402 indicates that the omission
was purposeful. 2 5 By omitting case law from the list, Congress ex-
pressed its intention to deprive the federal trial judge of the power
to create new, general rules of evidence.276 Because rules 402 and
403 are part of the same statutory scheme, they must be recon-
ciled. If trial judges could rely upon rule 403 as a source of author-
ity to create new general evidentiary rules, rule 403 would render
rule 402 irrelevant. The best harmonization of the two statutes is
the interpretation that rule 403 was never intended to serve as the
origin of new evidentiary rules of general applicability. Sensibly
construed, the rule contemplates ad hoc decisions by the judge.
Even if rule 403 has a procedural aspect, the rule cannot be
strained to permit the judge routinely to remove from the jury the
determination of the preliminary fact of the theory's validity. Rule
403, therefore, cannot be used to justify a shift of factfinding
power to the judge in every case involving scientific evidence.
271. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5223, at 155 (Supp. 1983).
272. United States v. Algie, 667 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1982).
273. FED. R. EvIn. 402.
274. Id.
275. See United States v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1978); 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5119, at 219, 222-23.
276. See United States v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1978).
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In summary, rule 104(b) and rule 901(b)(9) appear to commit to
the jury the determination of a scientific theory's validity. Al-
though plausible statutory construction arguments exist for shift-
ing the preliminary fact question from the jury to the judge under
rules 403 and 611(a), neither rule explicitly authorizes that shift,
and arguments against the shift are equally persuasive. To date, no
court has interpreted either rule 403 or rule 611(a) as overriding
rule 901(b)(9). As a matter of policy, the trial judge should deter-
mine the preliminary fact question. Rule 901(b)(9), however, ap-
parently prevents the implementation of that policy. Rather than
gambling on future favorable interpretations of rules 403 and 611,
a sounder course of action would be to delete subsection (b)(9)
from rule 901 and add legislative history specifically stating that
the deletion was calculated to reinstate the orthodox rule that the
trial judge determines the preliminary fact of a scientific theory's
validity.
V. CONCLUSION
At this point, the reader may suspect that this Article is a dis-
guised apologia for the Frye test. That suspicion is understanda-
ble. The argument presented in this Article and the argument
favoring the Frye rule share as a common denominator a skepti-
cism about lay jurors' factfinding capability. Ultimately, however,
the position taken in this Article is compatible with the attacks on
the Frye rule. If implemented, this Article's recommendation for
shifting factfinding power to the judge would eliminate one of the
obstacles to overruling Frye.
Overruling Frye would be consistent with the assignment of the
determination of the preliminary fact of a scientific theory's valid-
ity to the judge. Although the controversies over both Frye and the
allocation of the preliminary fact relate to the jury's competence,
the two issues are distinguishable. 7 The debate over the Frye test
centers on whether lay jurors can comprehend and be sufficiently
skeptical of scientific evidence. 7 8 The dispute over the assignment
of the preliminary fact focuses on an entirely different question: If
the jury decides that the preliminary fact does not exist, can the
277. Morgan, supra note 59, at 167.
278. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 6.
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jury effectively disregard the foundational evidence during its de-
liberations? The latter problem does not even arise until the jury
has demonstrated its skepticism and independence of mind by
finding that the foundational scientific evidence does not establish
the preliminary fact.
In other contexts, the same juror who easily can comprehend
foundational evidence may have tremendous difficulty disregarding
that evidence during deliberations after determining that the pre-
liminary fact does not exist. Consider, for example, a privilege ob-
jection that turns on whether a third party was present during an
attorney's conversation with his client.27 9 No one doubts the jury's
competence to decide whether a person was physically present
when the attorney and client conversed; the issue of a person's
presence at a particular time and place is a simple, straightforward
factual question that jurors can easily resolve. Yet we routinely as-
sign that determination of the preliminary fact to the judge.280 We
do so because the jury, having heard the foundational proof and
the contents of the proffered privileged communication, will have
difficulty complying with an instruction to disregard the communi-
cation if they find that it was privileged.281 No self-contradiction
arises by conceding the jury's ability to understand the founda-
tional evidence and assigning the preliminary fact determination to
the judge. Thus, a court convinced of the jury's competence to un-
derstand scientific evidence could nevertheless opt to assign the
determination of the preliminary fact of the theory's validity to the
judge.
More importantly, assigning that determination to the judge fa-
cilitates the rejection of the Frye test. Commentators have ex-
pressed growing concern about biased expert testimony.282 Some
scientific techniques also have latent weaknesses that are best ex-
posed by contrary expert testimony.283 Allocating the determina-
tion of the preliminary fact of a theory's validity to the jury aggra-
vates these problems. On that assumption, the trial judge usually
279. See generally 1 D. LounisLL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 28, at 173"78; 1 J.
WEiNsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 7 104104].
280. See supra note 279.
281. Kaplan, supra note 27, at 991.
282. See supra text accompanying note 31.
283. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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would have to accept the proponent's foundational proof at face
value;2 4 the opponent might be denied an opportunity to present
proof to the judge that would expose the technique's latent weak-
nesses." 5 If the abolition of Frye necessitated treating the fact of
the theory's validity as a fact conditioning logical relevance, the
undesirable procedural consequences would be an additional argu-
ment for retaining the Frye test. Contending that overruling Frye
will result in an allocation of the determination of the preliminary
fact to the jury, however, is a non sequlter. A court could abandon
the Frye test while following the traditional practice of committing
the determination of the preliminary fact to the judge. If the judge
has the power to determine the validity of scientific techniques,
the judge can perform a valuable function by eliminating untrust-
worthy scientific evidence from the deliberations of the jury.
284. See supra text accompanying note 173-74.
285. See id.
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